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FEDERAL JURISDICTION: THE PERILS AND 
REWARDS OF PULLING TIDNGS 
TOGETHER 
Gene R Shreve* 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JU-
DICIAL POWER. By Martin H. Redish. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. 1980. Pp. xiii, 361. $25. 
Professor Redish's book about the nature and limits of federal 
jurisdiction enters a field previously occupied by innumerable law 
review articles and books treating only parts of the subject. 1 No 
. stranger to the :field,2 he has produced a treatise of exceptional merit. 
* Visiting Associate Professor, The National Law Center, George Washington University. 
LL.B. 1968, LL.M. 1975, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. A list of some of the most prominent books might include: AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1967) 
(federal question and diversity jurisdiction, removal); P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. Ro-
SENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976) (federal appellate jurisdiction); 0. F1ss, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (the relationship of remedies to federal jurisdiction in civil rights 
cases); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1973) (jurisdiction oflower federal courts); G. 
GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975) (admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, federal common law); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (5th ed. 
1978) (Supreme Court jurisdiction). 
Several casebooks in the field should also be noted. See P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. 
MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 1975); C. McCORMICK, J. 
CHADBOURN & C. WRIGHT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (6th ed. 1976), 
They offer greater scope but are not intended to synthesize and clarify material as Professor 
Redish does in his book. 
Finally, Professor Charles Alan Wright's excellent work, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FED· 
ERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1976), should be noted. Although Professor Wright wrote the book for 
law students, it has reached a far greater and more sophisticated audience. It surveys issues of 
federal subject matter jurisdiction that are the concern of Professor Redish's book, as well as 
many other areas, e.g., the federal rules of civil procedure, personal jurisdiction and res judi-
cata. Professor Wright's book often does not, as a consequence, treat Professor Redish's sub-
jects with comparable length and detail. 
2. Two articles by Professor Redish now appear in "slightly revised" form as chapters in 
this book. See Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules oj .Decision Act: In Search ojthe Appropri-
ate .Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977) (appearing as chapter 7); Redish, The Anti-Injunc-
tion Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (1977) (appearing as chapter 10). 
He has published a number of other articles in the field. See Continuing the Erie .Debate: A 
Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1980); Revitalizing Civil Rights Re-
moval Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1980); The .Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: .Deference 
in Search oj a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); with Muench, Adjudication oj Fed-
eral Causes oj Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976); with Woods, Congressional 
Power to Control the Jurisdiction oj Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthe-
sis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1975). 
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He has attempted to design the book so that it can be read on two 
levels. First, and most successfully, he has written a collection of 
analytic essays on what he calls "twelve of the leading areas of fed-
eral jurisdiction."3 Most of the essays explore some aspect of the 
relationship between the state and federal courts. A scholar writing 
in an area so complex and, at times, controversial, necessarily runs 
the opposing risks of temporization and dogmatic assertion. Profes-
sor Redish falls prey to neither. While he develops and applies his 
own critical judgments on issues where viewpoints have differed, he 
is also scrupulously fair in presenting the other side.4 The result is 
not a monograph but a treatise in the true sense of the word. 
The second, and perhaps intellectually more important level is 
more difficult to understand. Professor Redish's introduction confi-
dently asserts that "the chapters are designed to be linked with one 
another on a broader level, as applications of a unified approach to 
the issues of judicial federalism."5 Despite his good intentions, how-
ever, the unified approach, if there is one, never materializes. In-
deed, it is difficult to see how it could have, given the diversity of the 
topics that make up the various chapters. Some subjects simply lack 
discernible strands of federalism - for example, the discussion of 
whether the Supreme Court exercises original or appellate jurisdic-
tion in a given class of cases (pp. 11-12), and comparisons between 
article I and article III courts (pp. 35-51 ). Most of the other topics 
treated at least arguably involve the tensions of federalism.6 But the 
contexts and characteristics of each issue vary so greatly that it is 
difficult to imagine how they could be successfully unified in one 
coherent theory of federal jurisdiction. Assuming that interests of 
3. P. 1. "Each chapter attempts to describe and to criticize the current state of the law as 
embodied in judicial decisions as well as in the theories ofleading commentators." P. 1. Titles 
of the twelve chapters explain clearly the coverage of the book: (1) "Congressional Power to 
Control Federal Court Jurisdiction," (2) "Legislative Courts," (3) ''The Scope of Lower Fed-
eral Court Power to Interpret Federal Law: Federal Question Jurisdiction," (4) ''The Power 
of the Federal Courts to Fashion Federal Common Law," (5) "State Courts and Federal 
Power," (6) "Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment," (7) ''Erie and the Rules of 
Decision Act," (8) "Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions: Procedural Limita-
tions," (9) "Abstention," (10) ''The Anti-Injunction Statute," (11) "Our Federalism," and 
(12) "Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction." P. ix. 
4. See, e.g., his exchange with Professor Fiss, described in note 21 infra.· 
5. P. I. He continues: ''The critique of decisions and theories advanced here, as well as 
the suggestions for alternative approaches contained within each chapter, may be seen as an 
attempt to reorganize the values and priorities underlying the allocation of judicial power." P. 
1 ( citation omitted). 
6. E.g., p. 8 (the constitutional debates); p. 62 (scope of federal question jurisdiction); pp. 
80 & 93 (federal common law); p. 119 (state court adjudication offederal claims); p. 197 (Erie); 
pp. 216-17 (Supreme Court review of state decisions); pp. 259-60 (the anti-injunction statute -
28 u.s.c. § 2283). 
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federalism have been violated, how does one equate the unwar-
ranted displacement of state governing law7 with the unwarranted 
displacement of state judicial forums, 8 or either with the unwar-
ranted revision of state judicial decisions?9 If there are answers to 
these questions, they do not appear in Redish's book. Each chapter 
begins a new topic10 and is relatively self-contained. There is no 
concluding chapter. Unless the author chooses to elaborate upon his 
theories elsewhere, the puzzle of his second theme may remain for-
ever locked in the book's introduction. 11 
I 
Federal Jurisdiction criticizes, as well as summarizes, the law. 
Professor Redish reserves his most trenchant criticisms for those who 
would invoke the doctrine of federalism to deny a federal forum to 
plaintiffs with federal claims. He states at the outset that "the integ-
rity of the Article III federal courts as the primary adjudicators of 
federal law must be preserved" (p. 1), and that "[a]n individual 
should . . . be presumed to be able to obtain judicial vindication of 
his federal rights in federal, rather than state court" (p. 1 ). He flatly 
rejects the common counterargument that federal and state courts 
provide an equal opportunity for the vindication of federal rights (p. 
2). Plaintiffs, he concludes, should not be forced to assert their fed-
eral claims before unsympathetic and perhaps less competent state 
judges.12 
The villain here is not Congress, but rather the far-reaching ab-
7. Either through violation of the Erie doctrine or excessive federal common law. 
8. For example, through unwarranted federal question jurisdiction. 
9. Either directly through unwarranted Supreme Court review or collaterally through 
abuse of federal habeas corpus. 
10. See note 3 supra. 
I I. This would be more of a concern had the author not succeeded so admirably in the 
book's first purpose. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, it is difficult to see how 
both objectives could be realized in the same book. 
12. Since the federal courts were given general federal question jurisdiction in 1875, 
those courts have developed a broad expertise in dealing with problems and applications 
at federal law. At the same time, state judges have been increasingly less exposed to the 
intricacies of federal substantive legal principles. Moreover, the fact that federal judges 
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate assures a floor of competence 
of the federal bench. There is no such assurance for state judges. Finally, federal judges 
retain the salary and life tenure protections of Article III, while many state judges must 
stand for election, a fact which significantly undermines their independence. 
P. I 19 (footnote omitted). 
An interesting dialogue on the appropriate roles of state and federal courts in the adjudica-
tion of federal rights can be found in the contributions of Professors Bator, Cover, Field, 
Newboume, and others in the Symposium, Stale Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 WM. 
& MARYL. REv. 599 (1981). 
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stention doctrine established recently in Younger v. Harris.13 A fed-
eral court's power to refuse to adjudicate a federal question properly 
brought before it is based upon the principle of self-restraint, derived 
from the equitable nature of the remedy sought. The decision 
whether to hear a case, then, involves a determination of whether 
"Our Federalism" (p. 298)14 might be better served by requiring the 
plaintiff to press his claim in state, rather than federal court. Unlike 
the earlier and narrower Pullman abstention doctrine, 15 which at 
least required the existence of an unclear or unsettled issue of state 
law, 16 Younger may deprive a plaintiff of the right to litigate before a 
federal tribunal when there is any possibility of a state remedy. As 
originally set out, Younger expressly applied only against plaintiffs 
seeking to enjoin ongoing state criminal prosecutions by filing a civil 
rights suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 The doctrine 
has since been extended to cover declaratory judgments against 
criminal proceedings.18 It has also been used to protect pending 
state civil proceedings, 19 even when they involved only private par-
13. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
14. The phrase, of course, is Justice Black's. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
15. Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
16. Pullman is the more limited and less onerous of the two doctrines. The Pullman doc-
trine applies when, first, the need to invalidate a state statute or regulation as unconstitutional 
can be avoided if state law is given a certain meaning and, second, that meaning is not clear 
enough for a federal court to feel comfortable in declaring, but is within the greater interpre-
tive power of a state court to define. 
When a federal constitutional question is not raised, rules governing abstention are more 
difficult to determine. Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 
25 (1959), with Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). 
There are a number of ways in which possibilities under state law have been used under 
the Pullman doctrine to avoid reaching the federal constitutional issues. The state law issue 
might be whether the challenged state statute might be defined so as to avoid constitutional 
problems, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natl. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), whether the 
challenged statute might not also violate the state constitution, Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 
(1970), or whether the case might not be disposed of short of considering the state statute or 
regulation under attack. Railroad Commn. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
Professor Redish has strongly criticized the deference that the federal courts accord the 
state courts when confronted with unresolved and important questions of statutory construc-
tion. He notes that "the federal court is certainly as capable as its state counterpart of constru-
ing state statutes in a manner that avoids constitutional difficulties." P. 234. The Supreme 
Court, however, continues to regard state supreme courts as the highest arbiters of the meaning 
of state law. See Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 n.9 (1978). Re-
cently the Supreme Court again applied the Pullman doctrine, this time to permit the Arizona 
courts the opportunity to apply a curative interpretation to portions of an Arizona statute. 
Babbit v. United Farm Workers Natl. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The exceptions to the doctrine were and are 
narrow and difficult to satisfy. See pp. 304-07. 
18. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), discussed at pp. 303-04. 
19. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainer v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 
(1977), discussed at pp. 316-18; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
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ties.20 It has sometimes been invoked to protect even state proceed-
ings commenced efter a federal suit was filed.21 The Younger 
doctrine, moreover, differs significantly from the Pullman doctrine in 
that its invocation leads to dismissal of the federal complaint and 
submits the frustrated plaintiff to the risks of claim or issue preclu-
sion generated by the state case. 22 
I share some of Professor Redish's dissatisfaction over the broad-
based withdrawal of federal trial forums for the adjudication of im-
portant federal rights - a particular (if not actually intended) conse-
quence of the Younger doctrine. I think, however, that an equity 
analysis can do more to resolve the problem than Professor Redish 
suspects. 23 
The principal vice of the usual Younger-type analysis is rigidity. 
Professor Redish notes: 
Except for the extremely narrow exceptions mentioned in Younger, 
deference under the doctrine is total in scope. The federal court makes 
no decision on the merits of the federal plaintiff's constitutional claims. 
Instead, the court informs the plaintiff that he has brought his claim to 
the wrong forum - in effect, that he has followed an incorrect proce-
dure in seeking to have his constitutional claim adjudicated. [Pp. 300-
01.] 
No matter how desperate the plaintifrs plight, if he falls within the 
ambit of the rule, he loses. The principal virtue, conversely, of a 
traditional equity analysis is flexibility.24 Close cases should be de-
cided not by hard-and-fast rules - which ignore the balance of the 
equities between the plaintiff and the defendant25 - but by particu-
20. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), discussed alp. 318. 
21. See Hi.::l,s v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), discussed al pp. 314-15. Shortly thereafter, 
however, a future criminal prosecution was enjoined in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 
(1977). Professor Redish is uncertain about the force of Wooley but, with characteristic fair-
ness, he presents the somewhat opposing view of Professor Fiss, who suggests that the way for 
injunctions against future prosecutions is clear. See pp. 312-13. I am inclined to agree with 
Professor Fiss, particularly in light of Zablocki v. Redhail, 334 U.S. 374, 379 n.5 (1978), de-
cided after Wooley. 
22. See Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). In Allen the Court held that the plaintiff 
was collaterally estopped from relitigating in a § 1983 damage suit a search and seizure issue 
that had been adjudicated in plaintiffs prior state criminal proceeding. 
23. He notes cryptically that "reliance on equity doctrines . . . only serves to distort the 
delicate balancing of competing state and federal interests which should be the true focus of 
the inquiry." P. 293. 
24. Granted, a plaintiff threatened with a constitutional wrong may be left without a pre-
ventative remedy. It may be appropriate for the court, in its equitable discretion, to deny a 
civil rights injunction, even in compelling cases of need, if the force of countervailing consider-
ations of federalism is strong enough. 
25. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 
(1970); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 357 (1973). The same inquiry is 
sometimes expressed as balancing the harms: Will it be more difficult for the defendant to live 
with the injunction than it will be for the plaintiff to live without it? 
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larized weighing of individual factors, the method characteristic of 
discretionary decision-making.26 Cases so decided would then both 
provide material for the development of a methodology to be used 
by federal trial judges in deciding questions of abstention and set 
outer limits for appellate review.27 Using equitable discretion, how-
ever, to justify the imposition of hard-and-fast rules conditioning the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction, is a distortion and an abuse of judi-
cial method. The Younger doctrine, in short, unjustifiably suspends 
the civil rights plaintiffs statutory right to litigate the merits of his 
claim in federal court. 
II 
Whatever the intrinsic merit of the Younger doctrine, its effects 
are largely indirect, at least in the limited sense that plaintiffs' rights 
remain theoretically undiminished. This may soon change. The 
most significant development in the field since Federal Jurisdiction 
was published may be the mood and movement in Congress to re-
duce the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Largely be-
cause of the delay and uncertainty invariably encountered in 
attempts to overrule unpopular Supreme Court decisions by consti-
tutional amendment, members of Congress are attempting to achieve 
the same end by introducing bills that will deprive lower courts of 
the opportunity to follow certain constitutional precedents and the 
Supreme Court of the power to enforce them. Bills pending at this 
writing would withdraw the authority of some or all federal courts to 
hear cases involving abortion,28 prayer in public schools,29 and 
26. See Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right - Toward A New Methodology of J)eci-
sionmaking, 14 Nw. U. L. REV. 894, 925 n.133 (1980). 
27. It is far from clear that federal appellate courts should repeat the entire weighing pro-
cess for each discretionary decision. The concept of discretion suggests a more restricted ap-
pellate role. Id. at 900 n.20. 
28. See S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 73, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 867, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). A more sophisticated approach can be found in S. 158, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S287-88 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1981). The first section of each defines the right to life, protected by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, as beginning with conception. The second section of 
each withdraws the authority of inferior article III courts to grant injunctive and declaratory 
relief in abortion cases. Each also invokes section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, presumably 
to provide Congress with added legislative authority. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 
(1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Fitzpatrick and Hutto support the special 
authority of Congress, derived from § 5, to suspend the effect of the eleventh amendment. It is 
at least doubtful, however, that section 5 confers upon Congress the authority to override the 
Supreme Court's own reading of the fourteenth amendment: "[T]he word 'person', as used in 
the fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 
(1973). 
29. See S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S1284 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1981); H.R. 
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school desegregation. 30 The possibility that some of these bills, or 
others like them, will be enacted is substantial.31 
Professor Redish's opening chapter carefully surveys the case law 
and scholarly commentary on the power of Congress to restrict the 
jurisdiction of federal courts under article III of the Constitution. 
After reviewing the possibility of inf erring limitations on Congress 
from the language of article III itself, and after examining the added 
problems of due process and the separation of powers, Professor 
Redish cautiously concludes that Congress probably can selectively 
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Some of the authorities 
whose views he discusses32 - as well as some who have made their 
views known only recently33 - have reached the opposite conclu-
sion. Still, the chapter does provide an excellent foundation and 
point of departure for further examination of a problem that recently 
has become so important. 
Other developments, too, have unfolded since the appearance of 
the book. Covering so much ground in so fast-moving an area, Pro-
fessor Redish faced the certainty that the book would soon begin to 
be outdated. There is no longer an amount-in-controversy require-
ment in 28 U.S.C. § 1331,34 and two recent Supreme Court deci-
sions35 would prompt him to alter his conclusions about the vitality 
of federal environmental common law.36 Other cases were decided 
408, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2347, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1981). 
30. See H.R. 869, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
31. Shortly after his retirement, Justice Potter Stewart observed, ''There have been such 
bills ever since I've been here. The problem now is that they seem more likely to pass." Jusllce 
Stewart (Retired), New YORKER, Oct. 19, 1981, at 36. See Kaufman, Congress v. The Court, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 44. 
32. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in .Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. Rev. 1362 (1953) (extensively cited throughout chapter I); 
Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 
(1974), discussed at p. 23; Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of /he 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rev. 157 (1960), discussed al p. 19. 
33. Raoul Berger, who largely agrees with Redish's position, particularly notes the diverg-
ing views of Lawrence Tribe and John Hart Ely. See Berger, Congressional Contraction of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 807, 807. For an excellent recent treatment of this 
subject, see Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term - Foreword· Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. Rev. 17 
(1981). 
34. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 
Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Supp. 1981)). Professor Redish refers to the now 
outdated requirement as one "well known to any attorney who litigates in federal court." P. 
21. 
35. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, IOI S. Ct. 1784 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage 
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., IOI S. Ct. 2615 (1981). 
36. See pp. 105-07. The author bases his analysis primarily on Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
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in time to be cited in the book but received insufficient attention, 
perhaps due to publication deadlines. Treatment of Walker v. Armco 
Steel Cop. 37 is confined to one footnote (p. 180 n.98), though the 
case is quite relevant to the Rules of Decision Act38 perspective that 
Professor Redish brings to bear on the Erie problem (p. 171). He 
devotes a chapter to Supreme Court doctrine requiring exhaustion of 
state judicial remedies, but discussion of Moore v. Sims,39 an impor-
tant case, is confined to two footnotes (pp. 307 n.108, 318 n.171 ). 
Of course, publishers' page proofs freeze the process of research 
and revision, and clairvoyance cannot be expected of Professor Red-
ish regarding matters that have taken shape since the book appeared. 
The best that can be done and what, I think, he has succeeded in 
doing, is to present a sufficiently thoughtful and resilient analysis of 
contemporary topics that will aid us in examining developments that 
follow the book's publication. 
CONCLUSION 
There are areas not covered by Professor Redish's book that 
would complement the topics treated. This is hardly a criticism, 
since the book is unparalleled in scope as it stands. It is more of a 
request for the author to produce an encore with a second volume. 
For example, it would be interesting to be able to compare his dis-
cussion of statutory federal question jurisdiction with developments 
in judge-made pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,40 his discussion of 
eleventh amendment doctrine with federal sovereign immunity,41 
and his treatment of exhaustion of state judicial remedies with ex-
haustion of state administrative remedies.42 An examination of 
federal habeas copus,43 especially, would disclose when and to what 
extent the possibility for federal judicial remedies in addition to 
those discussed might be available. Professor Redish's analysis of 
the Younger v. Harris doctrine provides extensive material for under-
standing the consequences of filing the federal lawsuit too late -
after state proceedings have begun. Missing, however, is an explana-
37. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
38. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1976). 
39. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). 
40. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
41. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note l, at 1373-77. 
42. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 
U. Cm. L. REV. 537 (1974). 
43. See Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's .Deference to the States in 
Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 low AL. REV. 233 (1979); Note, Guilt, Innocence, and Federal-
ism in Habeas Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. REv. ll23 (1980). 
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tion of the equally difficult problems that plaintiffs encounter if their 
lawsuits are filed too soon. These include problems of prematurity, 
which derive from article III of the Constitution. A discussion of the 
case or controversy requirement of article 11144 would further com-
plement the author's Younger analysis (p. 314 & n.147). And finally, 
a discussion of problems of federal judicial administration and their 
relation to developments in the law of federal jurisdiction45 would be 
useful. 
But on the whole, I found Professor Redish's book informative 
and constantly challenging. The thoroughness and honesty of his 
technique demonstrates how much controversy exists in the field of 
federal jurisdiction. It is a difficult branch of the law, one that at 
times may lead scholars and practitioners to agree with the assess-
ment that "what the legal system cannot answer it organizes."46 Pro-
fessor Redish's book is well organized, but the reader will find in it a 
good many answers as well. 
44. See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Cose and Conlro• 
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979). 
45. For example, docket congestion in the federal courts of appeal, see Betten, Institutional 
Reform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63 (1976); Carrington, Crowded .Dockets and the 
Courts of Appeals: The Threat lo the Function of Review and the Notional Low, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 542 (1969), has undoubtedly influenced the trend in recent Supreme Court cases to read 
statutory grants of federal appellate jurisdiction more narrowly. See Shreve, supra note 26, at 
nn. 186-87 and accompanying text. 
46. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 7 (1977). 
